American Impeachment procedure as defined by Alexander Hamilton in 1788.

 

At a time in our own history when a senior civil servant with a distinguished career Lord Butler of the Iraq Inquiry fame has castigated the present Executive of our once Democratic nation of Great Britain it is as well for us to view how the case for the New Constitution of the United States of America was clearly revealed in 1788:

by

 

Alexander Hamilton

 

James Madison & John Jay

in

 

THE FEDERALIST

OR, THE NEW CONSTITUTION

 

 

LONDON J.M.DENT & SONS LTD

[First published –Everyman’s Library – 1911]

 

 

Alexander Hamilton, born in the West Indies, 1757, but moved to New York 1772. Died there, the result of a duel.

 

James Madison, born in Virginia, 1751. President of the United States of America, 1809.  Died 1836.

 

John Jay, born in New York, 1745. Called to the Bar, 1768. Governor of New York, 1795. Died, 1829.

 

*

‘For many Americans the achievement of the revolution had been to secure self –government for the then thirteen separate States; yet in order to do so they had created a Union which had been made feasible by the common heritage and necessary by a common danger.   The preservation of this Union was perhaps an easier task than the creation of Union in the Twentieth-century Europe or Africa, for the will to Unite was there and no ancient animosities prevented a rational analysis of political needs; but these advantages were offset by the novelty of the task.  The precedents for Federal Government were few and unsatisfactory; the whole history of modern States seemed to demonstrate that local autonomy was incompatible with effective central government; and one of the best-known political maxims maintained that very large States must adopt autocratic forms of government.  The success of the Constitution in disproving these beliefs has made it a powerful influence upon subsequent history, not only of the United States, but also of the numerous countries, which have since adopted federal forms of government.

 

The Constitution, which emerged from Philadelphia, required the ratification, by popularly elected conventions in at least nine of the States, and in some its passage was not likely to be easy.  It was to explain and justify the Constitution in the important and doubtful State of New York that there appeared, between October 1787 and May 1788, eighty-five anonymous newspaper articles over the signature’Publius’.  Hurriedly written polemical essays are not the stuff from which classics of political science are normally made, but these essays, subsequently collected as The Federalist, were recognised by contempories as influential and by prosperity as an authoritive exposition of the ideas and intentions of the ‘founding fathers’

 

The explanation lies in the identity of the authors:

‘Publius’ concealed John Jay, who had been in charge of foreign affairs under the Articles of Confederation; Alexander Hamilton, who had played a leading and negotiation which had led to the meeting of the Philadelphia convention; and James Madison, whose contribution to its debates was so important that he has been called ‘the father of the Constitution’.   Jay was forced to withdraw through ill health, and Hamilton and Madison wrote between them eighty of the essays.  The Federalist was therefore written by men who had reflected deeply upon the political predicament of their country, but who were also at the forefront of politics and hoped to play an even more influential role in the new government, which they were helping to launch. 

 

The Federalist has an air of extraordinary maturity, but it was also the product of a young man’s world; Hamilton was thirty –two, Madison thirty- six and their ideas had been formed in an era of revolution, war and hectic debate.  Political theory and political action met therefore in a way which was almost unique.’

 

The great advantage that the society of the time had was its unique roots from the mother country Great Britain which enabled the new Constitution of the United States of America to come into existence to surprise the world.

 

To compare the monstrosity of the EU with any resemblance to the American federal model in which the emergence of the federal government was from the roots of their society- with the elite of Brussels to dominate from above can be easily shown by one reading the intelligent articles which were to enable a free people to protect their inheritance.

 

We have on this occasion selected one article to illustrate the method they were to adopt in regard to the important issue of Impeachment, which is proceeding in our own House of Commons against our ‘Servant of the People’ Tony Blair.

 

From the New York Packet, Tuesday, march 11, 1788.

 

THE FEDERALIST.  No LXVI

by

 

(Alexander Hamilton-President of the USA 1809)

 

To the People of the State of New York:

 

A review of the principal objections have appeared against the proposed court for the trial of impeachments will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavourable impressions which may still exist in regard to this matter.

 

The first of these objections is that the provision in question confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in the same body, in violation of that important and well-established maxim which requires a separation between the different departments of power.  The true meaning of this maxim has been discussed and ascertained in another place, and has been shown to be entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those departments for special purposes, preserving them, in he main, distinct and unconnected.

 

 This partial intermixture is even, in some cases, not only proper but also necessary to the mutual defence of the several members of the government against each other.  An absolute or qualified negative in the executive upon acts of the legislative body is admitted, by the ablest adepts in political science, to be an indispensable barrier against the encroachments of the latter upon the former. And it may, perhaps, with no less reason be contended that the powers relaying to IMPEACHMENT are, as before intimated, an essential check in the hands of that body upon encroachments of the Executive.

 

The division of them between the two branches of the legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other the right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of persecution, from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those branches.  As the concurrence of two –thirds of the Senate will be requisite to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from this additional circumstance, will be as complete as itself can desire.

 

It is curious to observe with what vehemence this part of the plan is assailed, on the principle here taken notice of, by men who profess to admire, without exception, the Constitution of the State; while that Constitution makes the Senate together with the Chancellor and Judges of the Supreme Court, not only a Court of Impeachments but the highest judicatory in the State, in all causes, civil and criminal.

 

The proportion in point of numbers, of the Chancellor and Judges to the Senators is so inconsiderable that the judiciary authority of New York, in the last resort, may, with truth, be said to reside in the Senate.  If the plan of the Convention be, in this respect, chargeable with a departure fro the celebrated maxim which has been so often mentioned, and seems to be so little understood, how much more culpable must be the Constitution of New York?  

(In that of New Jersey, also, the final judiciary is in a branch of the legislature. In New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, one branch of the legislature is the court for the trial of impeachments. - Publius.).

 

A second objection to the Senate, as a court of impeachments, is that it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in that body, tending to give to the government a countenance too autocratic.  The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent authority with the Executive in the formation of treaties and in the appointment to offices:  if say the objectors, to these prerogatives is added that of deciding predominacy to senatorial influence.  To an objection so little precise in itself, it is not easy to find a very precise answer.   Where is the measure or criterion to which we can appeal for determining what will give the Senate too much, too little, or barely the proper degree of influence?

 

 Will it not be more safe, as well as more simple, to dismiss such vague and uncertain calculations, to examine each power by itself?  And to decide, on general principles, where it may be deposited with more advantage and least inconvenience?   

 

If we take this course, it will lead to a more intelligible, if not a certain result.  The disposition of the power of making treaties, which has obtained in the plan of the Convention, will, then, if I mistake not, appear to be fully justified by the considerations stated in the former number [essay], and by others which will occur under the next head of our inquires. 

 

The expediency of the junction of the Senate with the Executive, in the power of appointing to offices, will, I trust, be placed in a light not less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under the same head. And I flatter myself the observations in my last paper must have gone no inconsiderable way towards proving that it was not easy, if practical, to find a more fit receptacle for the power of determining Impeachments, than that which has been chosen.  If this is truly the case, the hypothetical dread of the too great weight of the Senate ought to be discarded from our reasoning.

 

But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been refuted in the remarks applied to the duration in office prescribed for the Senators.   It was by them shown, as well on the credit of historical examples, as from the reason of the thing, that the most popular branch of every government, partaking of the republican genius, by being generally the favourite of the people, will be as generally a full match, if not a n overmatch, for every member of the Government.

 

But independent of this most active and operative principle, to secure the equilibrium of the national House of Representatives, the plan of the Convention has provided in its favour to be conferred upon the Senate.  The exclusive privilege of originating money bills will belong to the House of Representatives.  The same House will possess the sole right of instituting Impeachments:  is not this a complete counterbalance to that of determining them?  The same House will be umpire in all elections of the President, which do not unite the suffrages of a majority of the whole number of electors; a case which cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently, happen.

 

The constant possibility of the thing must be a fruitful source of influence to that body.  The more it is contemplated, the more important will appear this ultimate though contingent power, of deciding the competitions of the most illustrious citizens of the Union, for the first office in it.  It would not perhaps be rash to predict that as a mean of influence it will be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the Senate.

 

A third objection to the Senate as a court of impeachments is drawn from the agency they are to have in the appointments to office.  It is imagined that they would be too indulgent judges of the conduct of men, in whose official creation they had participated.  The principle of the objection would condemn a practice which is to be seen in all the State Governments, if not in all governments with which we are acquainted:  I mean that of rendering those who hold offices during pleasure dependent on the pleasure of those who appoint them.   With equal plausibility might it be alleged in this case that the favouritism of the latter would always be an asylum for the misbehaviour of the former.

 

But that practice, in contradiction to this principle, proceeds upon the presumption that the responsibility of those who appoint, for the fitness and competency of the persons on whom they bestow their choice, and the interest they will have in the respectable and prosperous administration of affairs, will inspire a sufficient disposition to dismiss from a share in it all such who, by their conduct, shall have proved themselves unworthy of the confidence reposed in them.

 

Though facts may not always correspond with this presumption, yet if it be, in the main, just, it must destroy the supposition that the Senate, who will merely sanction the choice of the Executive, should feel a bias towards the objects of that choice, strong enough to blind them to the evidences of guilt so extraordinary, as to have induced the representatives of the nation to be the accusers.

 

If any further arguments were necessary to evince the improbability of such a bias, it might be found in the nature of the agency of the Senate in the business of appointments.

 

It will be the office of the President to nominate, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint.  There will of course, be no exertion of choice on the part of the Senate.  They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another; but they cannot themselves choose –they can only ratify or reject the choice of the President.

 

They might even entertain a preference to some other person, at the very moment they were assenting to the one proposed, because there might be no positive ground of opposition to him; and they could not be sure, if they withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would fall on their favourite, or upon any other person in their estimation more meritorious than the one rejected.   Thus it could hardly happen the majority of the Senate would feel any other complacency towards the object of appointment than such as the appearances of merit might aspire. and the proofs of a want to destroy.

 

A fourth objection to the Senate, in the capacity of a court of impeachments, is derived from its union with the Executive in the power of making treaties.  This, it has been said, would constitute the Senators their own judges, in every case of a corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust.  After having combined with the Executive in betraying the interests of the Nation in a ruinous treaty [Well! we in Great Britain have had our fair or possible more than ample share of ruinous treaties since 1972?]    What prospect, it is asked, would there be of their being made to suffer the punishment they would deserve, when they were themselves to decide upon the accusation brought against them for the treachery of which they have been guilty?

 

 [In our own Island today we have our own traitors: Edward Heath-Tony Blair- -Geoffrey Howe- Peter Mandelson- Alistair Campbell- and hundreds of other traitors who have lied and connived to deceive and betray the British People over the past 32 years- where were our checks and balances?]

 

 TO CONTINUE:  This objection [to the Senate] has been circulated with more earnestness and with greater show of reason than any other which has appeared against this part of the plan; and yet I am deceived if it does not rest upon an erroneous foundation.

 

The security essentially intended by the Constitution against corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties is to be sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to make them.   The JOINT AGENCY of the Chief Magistrate of the Union and of two-thirds of the members of a body selected by the collective wisdom of the legislatures of the several States is designed to be a pledge for the fidelity of the national councils in this particular.

 

The Convention might with propriety have mediated the punishment of the Executive, for a deviation from the instructions of the Senate, or a want of integrity in the conduct of negotiations committed to him; they might also have had in view the punishment of a few leading members of the Senate, who should have prostituted their influence in that body as the mercenary instruments of foreign corruption:

 

But they could not, with more or equal propriety, have contemplated the Impeachment and punishment of two-thirds of the Senate consenting to an improper treaty, than a majority of that or of the other branch of the national legislature consenting to a pernicious or unconstitutional law-a principle which, I believe, has never been admitted into any

Government.  How, in fact, could a majority in the House of Representatives impeach themselves?  Not better, it is evident, than two-thirds of the Senate might try themselves?

 

And yet what reason is there that a majority of the House of Representatives, sacrificing the interests of the society by an unjust and tyrannical act of Legislation, should escape with impunity, more than two-thirds of the Senate, sacrificing the same interests in an injurious treaty with a foreign power?

 

[Well! again there have been numerous examples in our own House of Commons since 1972 and lately with the use of the Parliament Bill in an improper way. What members of the House since the 70’s should realise that they themselves are culpable for the acts of TREASON as their true purpose is to give their honest opinion in defence of the protection of their Constitution and Country before their Party.  Those dissentient observers in the House should have formed their own party years ago but instead have used their debating abroad instead of taking positive action as an excuse for their dilatory manner in not rebelling against the Party Line. There have been some rebellions but they have been dissipated by their need to keep their seats and their inflation-proof pensions and those wonderful benefits of being in the best Club in town this side of our once protective moat of history – they have a chance in May 2005 to relent?]

TO CONTINUE:  The truth is, that in all cases it is essential to the freedom and to the necessary independence of the deliberations of the body, that the members of it should be exempt from punishment foe acts done in a collective capacity; and the security to the society must depend on the care which is taken to confide the trust to proper hands, to make it their interest to execute it with fidelity, and to make it as difficult as possible for them to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good.

 

So far as might concern the misbehaviour of the Executive in perverting the instructions or contravening the views of the Senate, we need not be apprehensive of the want of a disposition in that body to punish the abuse of its confidence, or to vindicate their own authority.  We may thus far count upon their pride, if not their virtue. 

 

And so far even as might concern the corruption of leading members, by whose arts and influence the majority may have been inveigled into measures odious to the community, if the proofs of that corruption should be satisfactory, the usual propensity of human nature will warrant us in concluding that there would be commonly no defect of inclination in the body to divert the public resentment from themselves by a ready sacrifice of the authors of their mismanagement and disgrace.                                    

                                              PUBLIUS.

[Font altered-bolding used-comments in brackets]

 

*          *          *            

 12/04

 

 

*

 

www.eutruth.org.uk

*

www.thewestminsternews.co.uk

*

 

www.speakout.co.uk

*

 

Daniel Hannan - Forming an OPPOSITION to the EU

www.telegraph.co.uk.blogs

 

*

 

 

VOTE

MAY -2007

 

TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION

WITH THE ONLY PARTY WITH A MANDATE

TO SET YOU

 FREE

 

THE

UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY

www.ukip.org

 

TO RECLAIM YOUR DEMOCRACY DON'T VOTE FOR THE TRIPARTITE PARTIES IN WESTMINSTER

BUT

SMALL PARTIES THAT SPEAK THEIR MINDS WITHOUT SPIN AND LIES.

*

 

ONLY

PRO-PORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

WILL BRING DEMOCRACY BACK TO THE ENGLISH PEOPLE

*

Home Rule for Scotland

WHY NOT

HOME RULE for ENGLAND

 

*

MAY/07

 

[All underlined words have a separate bulletin

THE QUESTION THAT THE VOTER MUST ANSWER

 

‘DO YOU WISH TO BE GOVERNED BY YOUR OWN PEOPLE, LAW AND CUSTOM OR BY THE CORRUPT ,EXPENSIVE UNACCOUNTABLE AND ALIEN BUSYBODY BRUSSELS’

 

-SIMPLE IS IT NOT?