The
Nameless War
Appendix 6
-
German White Book on the Last Phase of the
German-Polish Crisis
[Added by us to further
elucidate Captain Ramsay's comments in
Chapter 6, re: the German-Polish situation,
orchestrated to start WWII and blame Hitler
/ Germany.
My following comments are for
the sake of our visitors to the site who are
just beginning to awaken to the lies into
which we have ALL been born. Sharing my
awakening with you:
We were -- most all of
us -- 'educated' in the U.S. Government
indoctrination centers that we called
'schools'. Education has been controlled
and therefore, history has been manufactured
by the victors of every war in which
American soldiers have fought and died (or
been maimed physically and/or emotionally
for life).
The 'victors' of all
those wars have been the same group of
creatures who've planned to control the
world for millennia, and who are behind the
present neverendingwar on 'terror'. The
terror emanates from them. Always has, and
they boastingly admit thus in the Protocols
of the Learned Elders of Zion.
As I began to see this,
I wondered why we were taught that "'Germany
started the first 'Great War'", when in fact
that was a lie. Then, I wondered: if Germany
didn't start that war, WHY was Germany the
brunt of the 'victors' wrath? And the same
for WWII?
When you take a look at
your globe, then, you see that Germany IS
the gateway to the west -- or the barrier
FROM the west -- that either paved the way
for or barred the way
from the Mongol-Bolshevik hordes
whose masters' plan was to sweep across
Western Europe, gobbling up country after
country, enslaving the inhabitants therein.
They've done it, you
know. However, they left the geographical
borders intact, while politically erasing
the national, state and local borders (via
Regional Governance), and the people
slept, while the leaders of their government
were installed by their new 'masters'.
The 'creatures' call
themselves 'Jews' and their 'lesser
brethren' are the great tool used to
infiltrate and swarm over the world like
locusts, devouring every living thing. Oh,
the people are still living? Is one 'alive'
merely because one still breaths and moves
and eats and sleeps and shops and has sex
and attends or watches 'the games'?
I
say then, they are the walking dead, because
their minds, and therefore their souls have
been captured. The mind IS the gateway to
the soul, after all.
This, and all
information presented on this website is to
hopefully strike a chord somewhere in the
hearts and minds of our visitors / readers
who have heretofore been 'blissfully
ignorant'.
As we awaken, we each
have the responsibility then to live
accordingly, remove ourselves as far as
possible from the 'culture' manufactured for
us, and to reach out to our sleeping
brethren.
I can't imagine any
other reason for being in this third
dimensional time and space at this
particular time in earth's history.
Jackie - July 9th, 2003]
From the:
GERMAN WHITE BOOK
DOCUMENTS
Concerning the Last Phase
of
the
German-Polish Crisis
GERMAN LIBRARY OF INFORMATION
NEW
YORK
Note on the German White
Book (pp 3-6)
The German White Book,
presented herewith, is a collection of
official documents and speeches, not a
collection of uncontrollable conversations.
It does not pretend to cover the entire
field of German-Polish relations but, as the
title implies, concerns itself solely with
the last phase of the German-Polish crisis,
from August 4th to September 3rd, 1939.
the Polish-german
controversy concerning the Corridor, Upper
Silesia and Danzig, began in 1919; it has
never, since the signing of the Versailles
Treaty, ceased to agitate europe. For many
years intelligent commentators and statesmen
of all nations, including Great Britain,
agreed that the separation of East Prussia
from the Reich and, indeed, the whole Polish
settlement, was unjust and fraught with
danger.
Germany, again and
again, made attempts to solve the
differences between the two countries in a
friendly spirit. It was only when all
negotiations proved vain and Poland joined
the encirclement front against Germany, that
chancellor Hitler cut the Gordian knot with
the sword. It was England that forced the
sword into his hand.
Great Britain asserts in
her Blue Book and elsewhere that she was
compelled to "guaranty" Poland against
"aggression" for reason of international
morality. Unfortunately the British
Government subsequently admitted
(Under-Secretary of State Butler, House of
Commons, October 19, 1939) that the
"guaranty" was aimed solely against Germany.
It was not valid in case
of conflicts with other powers. In other
words, the British "guaranty" was merely a
link in the British encirclement chain. The
Polish crisis was deliberately manufactured
by Great Britain with the connivance of
Poland: it was the fuse designed to set off
the explosion!
Great Britain naturally
attempts to becloud this fact. Official
British statements on the outbreak of the
war place great emphasis on the allegation
that England did not give a formal
"guaranty" to Poland until March 31, 193,
whereas the German demand on Poland, which
Poland rejected, was made on march 21st.
Britain contends that the British "guaranty"
was merely the consequence of the German
demand of March 21st.
Britain denies that her
"guaranty" stiffened Polish resistance. She
insists that Germany took advantage of a
moment of highly strained international
tension by springing upon Poland her demand
for an extra-territorial road through the
Corridor between the Reich and East Prussia.
The British ignore a
vital fact in this connection. The existence
of the "guaranty", not its formal
announcement, was the decisive factor. The
future may reveal when the British promise
was first dangled before Poland. In any
event, Poland was assured of British aid
before March 21st.
Chamberlain's speech of
march 17, 1939, and the statement by Lord
Halifax of March 20th, (both reprinted in
the British Blue Book) leave no doubt on
that question. The British "guaranty" was in
the nature of a blank check. Poland did not
know when she marched to her doom, that the
check would not be honored.
The allegations that the
Poles were surprised or overwhelmed by the
German proposals, does not hold water.
Poland was fully informed of the German
demands. When as Herr von Ribbentrop points
out in his Danzig speech (October 24, 1939)
chancellor Hitler in 1934 concluded a
Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact with
Marshal Pilsudski, it was clearly understood
that the problem of Danzig and the Corridor
must be solved sooner or later. Chancellor
Hitler hoped that it would be solved within
the framework of that instrument.
Poland callously
disregarded her obligations under the
German-Polish Pact, after the death of
Marshal Pilsudski. The persecution of German
minorities in Poland, Poland's measures to
strangle Danzig economically, the insolent
manner the Polish Government chose to adopt
with the British blank check in its pocket
and the Polish mobilization frustrated
chancellor Hitler's desire to settle
Polish-German differences by peaceful
negotiation, as he had solved every other
problem arising from the bankruptcy of
statesmanship at Versailles.
No one can affirm that
the National Socialist Government did not
attempt with extraordinary patience to
impress upon Poland the desirability of a
prompt and peaceful solution. The Polish
Government was familiar with the specific
solution proposed by Chancellor Hitler since
October 24, 1938. The nature of the German
proposals was discussed at least four times
between the two governments before March 21,
1939.
On October 24, 1938, von
Ribbentrop, the German foreign Minister,
proposed to the Polish Ambassador, Lipski,
four steps to rectify the injustice of
Versailles and to eliminate all sources of
friction between the two countries.
1). The return of the Free
City of Danzig to the Reich, without
severance of its economic ties to the Polish
State. (The arrangement vouchsafed to Poland
free port privileges and extra-territorial
access to the harbor.)
2.) An exterritorial [sic]
route of communication through the Corridor
by rail and motor to reunite Germany and
East Prussia.
3.) Mutual recognition by
the two States of their frontiers as final
and, if necessary, a mutual guaranty of
their territories.
4.) The extension of the
German-Polish Pact of 1934 from ten to
twenty-five years.
On January 5, 1939,
Poland's Foreign Minister, Josef Beck,
conferred with the German chancellor on the
problems involved. At this time Chancellor
Hitler offered Beck a clear and definite
guaranty covering the Corridor, on the basis
of the four points outlined by von
Ribbentrop. The following day, January 6th,
at Munich, the German Foreign Minister once
more confirmed Germany's willingness to
guaranty, not only the Corridor, but all
Polish territory.
The generous offer for a
settlement along these line, liquidating all
friction between the two countries, was
reiterated when Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop paid a state visit to Warsaw
(January 23rd to 17th, 1939). On that
occasion von Ribbentrop again offered a
guaranty of the Polish-German boundaries and
a final all-inclusive settlement of
German-Polish relations.
Under the circumstances
it is absurd to allege that Poland was
"surprised" by the German proposal of March
21st, and subsequent developments. It is
possible that Poland may have concealed
Germany's friendly and conciliatory offers
from Paris and London. With or without
British promptings, Poland prepared the
stage for a melodramatic scene, in which the
German villain brutally threatened her
sovereignty and her independence.
In spite of Polish
intransigence, culminating in threats of
war, Chancellor Hitler made one more
desperate attempt to prevent the conflict.
He called for a Polish plenipotentiary to
discuss the solution presented in Document
15 of the German White book. This solution
envisaged the return of Danzig to the Reich,
the protection of Polish and German
minorities, a plebiscite in the Corridor
under neutral auspices, safeguarding,
irrespective of the result, Poland's
unimpeded exterritorial access to the sea.
The British are please
to describe this reasonable document as an
"ultimatum". This is a complete distortion
of the facts. The German government, it is
true, had set a time-limit (August 30th) for
the acceptance of its proposal, but it
waited twenty-four hours after its
expiration before concluding that the
possibilities of diplomatic negotiations had
been exhausted. There was ample opportunity
for England and Poland to act within those
twenty-four hours.
The British take the
position that Germany's demands were not
known either in Warsaw or London. That
pretense is demolished by the British Blue
Book itself, for we find here a dispatch
from Sir Nevile Henderson, the British
Ambassador to Berlin, which leaves no doubt
that he relayed the German proposal to
London after his midnight conference with
von Ribbentrop on August 30th, and that he
understood the essential points of the
German proposal. Henderson even transmitted
to the British Government Chancellor
Hitler's assurance that the Polish
negotiator would be received as a matter of
course on terms of complete equality with
the courtesy and consideration due to the
emissary of a sovereign state.
Henderson sent his night
message not only to Downing Street, but also
to the British Embassy in Warsaw. There is
evidence, which has recently come into the
possession of the German Foreign Office
that, in spite of all its protestations of
ignorance and helplessness, the British
Cabinet communicated the substance of
Henderson's midnight conversation with the
German Foreign Minister directly to the
Polish Government. The London Daily
Telegraph, in a late edition of August 31st,
printed the following statement:
"At the Cabinet
Meeting yesterday, at which the terms of
the British Note were approved, it was
decided to send a massage to Warsaw,
indicating the extent of the latest
demands from Berlin for the annexation
of territory".
This item appeared only
in a few issues. It was suppressed in later
editions.
Germany's demands were
so reasonable that no sane Polish Government
would have dared to reject them. They
certainly would have been accepted if
England had advised moderation. There was
one more chance to preserve peace on
September 2nd. It was offered by a message
from Premier Mussolini (Document 20). The
Italian suggestion was acceptable to Germany
and France (Document 21). but was rejected
by Great Britain (Document 22).
---------------------------------------------------------------
1.
THE
LAST PHASE
of
the German-Polish Crisis
(pp.7-12)
Appended to this are
printed the documents which were exchanged
during the last days before the beginning of
the German defensive action against Poland
and the intervention of the western Powers,
or which in any other respect refer to these
events. These documents, when shortly
recapitulated, give the following general
survey:
1). At the beginning of
August the Reich Government was informed of
an exchange of notes between the
representative of Poland in Danzig and the
Senate of the Free City (Danzig), according
to which the Polish Government in the form
of a short-term ultimatum and under threat
of retaliatory measures had demanded the
withdrawal of an alleged order of the Senate
-- an order which, in fact, had never been
issued -- concerning the activities of
Polish customs inspectors (Documents 1 to
3).
This caused the Reich Government to inform
the Polish Government, on August 9th, that a
repetition of such demands in the form of an
ultimatum would lead to an aggravation of
the relations between Germany and Poland,
for the consequences of which the Polish
government would alone be responsible.
At the same time, the
attention of the Polish Government was drawn
to the fact that the maintenance of the
economic measures adopted by Poland against
Danzig would force the Free City to seek
other export and import possibilities
(Document 4).
The Polish government
answered this communication from the Reich
Government with an aide-Memoire of August
10th, handed to the German Embassy in
Warsaw, which culminated in the statement
that Poland would interpret every
intervention of the Reich Government in
Danzig matters, which might endanger Polish
rights and interests there, as an aggressive
action (Document 5).
2). On August 22nd, the
British Prime Minister, Mr. Neville
Chamberlain, acting under the impression of
announcements of the impending conclusion of
a Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and
the U.S.S.R., sent a personal letter to the
Fuhrer. Here he expressed on the one hand
the firm determination of the British
Government to fulfill its pledged
obligations to Poland, on the other hand,
the view that it was most advisable in the
first instance to restore an atmosphere of
confidence and then to solve the
German-Polish problems through negotiations
terminating in a settlement which should be
internationally guaranteed (Document 6).
The Fuhrer, in his reply
of August 23rd, set forth the real
causes of the German-Polish crisis.
He referred in
particular to the generous proposal made by
him in March of this year and stated that
the false reports spread by England
at that time regarding a German mobilization
against Poland, the equally incorrect
assertions about Germany's aggressive
intentions towards Hungary and Roumania
and, finally, the guarantee given by England
and France to the Polish Government had
encouraged the Polish Government not only to
decline the German offer but to let loose a
wave of terror against the Germans domiciled
in Poland and to strangle Danzig
economically. At the same time, the Fuhrer
declared that Germany would not let herself
be kept back from protecting her vital
rights by any methods of intimidation
whatsoever (Document 7).
3). Although the
above-mentioned letter from the British
Prime Minister of August 22nd, as well as
speeches made on the subsequent day by
British statesmen, showed a complete lack of
understanding for the German standpoint, the
Fuhrer nevertheless resolved to make a fresh
attempt to arrive at an understanding with
England.
On August 25th, he
received the British Ambassador, once more
with complete frankness explained to him his
conception of the situation, and
communicated to him the main principles of
comprehensive and far-sighted agreement
between Germany and England which he would
offer to the British Government once the
problem of Danzig and the Polish Corridor
was settled (Document 8).
4). while the British
government were discussing the preceding
declaration from the Fuhrer, and exchange of
letters took place between the French
President, M. Daladier, and the Fuhrer. In
his answer the Fuhrer again submitted his
reasons for Germany's standpoint in the
German Polish question and once more
repeated his firm decision to regard the
present Franco-German frontier as final
(Documents 9 and 10).
5). In their answer to the
step taken by the Fuhrer on August 25th,
which was handed over on the evening of
August 28th, the British Government declared
themselves prepared to consider the proposal
for a revision of Anglo-German
relationships. They further stated that a
they had received a definite assurance from
the Polish Government that they were
prepared to enter into direct discussions
with The Reich Government on German-Polish
questions.
At the same time they
repeated that in their opinions a
German-Polish settlement must be safeguarded
by international guarantees (Document 11).
Despite grave misgivings
arising from the whole of Poland's previous
attitude and despite justifiable doubts in a
sincere willingness on the part of the
Polish Government for a direct settlement,
the Fuhrer, in his answer handed to the
British Ambassador on the afternoon of
August 29th, accepted the British proposal
and declared that the Reich Government
awaited the arrival of a Polish
representative invested with plenipotentiary
powers on August 30th. At the same time the
Fuhrer announced that the Reich Government
would immediately draft proposals for a
solution acceptable to them and would, if
possible, have these ready for the British
Government before the Polish negotiator
arrived (Document 12).
6). In the course of August
30th, neither a Polish negotiator with
plenipotentiary powers nor any communication
from the British Government about steps
undertaken by them reached Berlin. On the
contrary, it was on this day that the Reich
Government were informed of the ordering of
a general Polish mobilization
(document 13).
Only at midnight did the
British Ambassador hand over a new
memorandum which, however, failed to
disclose any practical progress in the
treatment of Polish-German questions and
confined itself to a statement that the
Fuhrer's answer of the preceding day was to
be communicated to the Polish Government and
that the British Government considered it
impracticable to establish a German-Polish
contact so early as on August 30th
(Document 14).
7). Although the
non-appearance of the Polish negotiator had
done away with the conditions under which
the British government were to be informed
of the Reich government's conception of the
basis on which negotiations might be
possible, the proposals since formulated by
the Reich were none the less communicated
and explained in detail to the British
Ambassador when he handed over the
above-mentioned memorandum.
The Reich Government
expected that now at any rate, subsequently
to this, a Polish plenipotentiary would be
appointed. Instead, the Polish Ambassador in
Berlin made a verbal declaration to the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs on the
afternoon of August 31st, to the effect that
the Polish Government had been informed in
the preceding night by the British
government that there was a possibility of
direct negotiations between the Reich
Government and the Polish Government, and
that the Polish Government were favorably
considering the British proposal.
When expressly asked by
the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
whether he had the authority to negotiate on
the German proposals, the Ambassador stated
that he was not entitled to do so, but had
merely been instructed to make the foregoing
verbal declaration. A further question from
the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
whether he could enter into an objective
discussion on the matter was expressly
denied by the Ambassador.
8). The Reich Government
thus were confronted with the fact that they
had spent two days waiting in vain for a
Polish plenipotentiary. On the evening of
August 31st, they published the German
proposals with a short account of the events
leading up to them (Document 15).
These proposals were
described as unacceptable by Polish
broadcast (Document 16).
9). Now that every
possibility for a peaceful settlement of the
Polish-German crisis was thus exhausted, the
Fuhrer saw himself compelled to resist by
force the force which the Poles had long
employed against Danzig, against the Germans
in Poland, and finally, by innumerable
violations of the frontier, against Germany.
10). On the evening of
September 1st, the Ambassadors of Great
Britain and France handed to the Reich
Minister for Foreign Affairs two notes
couched in the same terms in which they
demanded that Germany should withdraw her
troops from Polish territory, and declared
that if this demand were not conceded, their
respective Governments would fulfill their
obligations to Poland without further delay
(Documents 18 and 19).
11). In order to banish the
menace of war, which had come dangerously
close in consequence of these two notes, the
Duce made a proposal for an armistice and a
subsequent conference for the settlement of
the German-Polish conflict (Document 20).
The Germans and the
French Government replied in the affirmative
to this proposal whilst the British
Government refused to accept it (Documents
21 and 11).
That this was so was
already apparent in the speeches made by the
British Prime Minister and the British
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on
the afternoon of September 2nd in the
British Houses of Parliament, and a
communication to that effect was made to the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs by the
Italian Ambassador on the evening of
September 2nd. Thus also in the opinion of
the Italian Government the initiative of
the Duce had been wrecked by England.
12). On September 3rd, at 9
a.m., the British Ambassador arrived at the
German Foreign Office and handed over a note
in which the British Government, fixing a
time limit of two hours, repeated their
demand for a withdrawal of the German troops
and, in the event of a refusal, declared
themselves to be at war with Germany after
this time limit had expired (Document 23).
The British Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs on September 3rd,
1939, at 11:15 a. m. delivered a note to the
German Charge d'Affairs in London in which
he informed him that a state of war existed
between the two countries as from 11 a. m.
on September 3rd (Document 24).
On the same day, at
11:30 a. m. the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs handed to the British Ambassador in
Berlin a memorandum from the Reich
Government in which the Reich rejected the
demands expressed by the British Government
in the form of an ultimatum and in which it
was proved that the responsibility for the
outbreak of war rested solely with the
British Government (Document 25).
On the afternoon of
September 3rd, the French Ambassador in
Berlin called on the Reich Minister for
Foreign Affairs and inquired whether the
Reich government were in a position to give
a satisfactory answer to the question
directed to them by the French government in
their note of September 1st. The Reich
Minister for Foreign Affairs told the
Ambassador that after the English and French
Notes of September had been handed to him,
the Head of the Italian Government had made
a new intermediary proposal, to which the
Duce had added, the French Government had
agreed.
The Reich Government had
informed the Duce on the preceding day that
they were also prepared to accept the
proposal.
The Duce however had
informed them later on in the day that his
proposal had been wrecked by the
intransigent attitude of the British
Government.
The British Government
several hours previously had presented
German with an ultimatum which had been
rejected on the German side by a memorandum
which he, the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs, would hand over to the French
Ambassador for his information.
Should the attitude of
France towards Germany be determined by the
same considerations as that of the British
Government, the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs could only regret this fact.
Germany had always sought understanding
with France. Should the French Government,
despite this fact adopt a hostile attitude
towards Germany on account of their
obligations towards Poland, the German
people would regard this as a totally
unjustifiable aggressive war on the part of
France against the Reich.
The French Ambassador
replied that he understood from the remarks
of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
that the Reich Government were not in a
position to give a satisfactory answer to
the French Note of September 1st. Under
these circumstances he had the unpleasant
task of informing the Reich Government that
the French Government were forced to fulfill
the obligations which they had entered into
towards Poland, from September 3rd at 5 p.m.
onwards.
The French Ambassador at
the same time handed over a corresponding
written communication (CF, Document 26).
The Reich Minister for
Foreign Affairs thereupon declared in
conclusion the the French Government would
bear the full responsibility for the
suffering which the nations would have to
bear if France attacked Germany.
_____________________________________________
The full transcript of the
German White Book will be posted
here, if you wish to become further
enlightened. - J
